\u3ci\u3eLockett\u3c/i\u3e Symposium: \u3ci\u3eLockett\u3c/i\u3e As It Was, Is Now, and Ever Shall Should Be by Steele, Karen A.
77 
LOCKETT SYMPOSIUM 
LOCKETT AS IT WAS, IS NOW, AND EVER SHALL
SHOULD BE 
Karen A. Steele* 
Recognizing that the sentencing phase of a capital trial is a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting a death 
sentence,1 the Lockett Court sought to give states “the clearest guidance” 
that limiting the range of mitigating factors which may be considered by 
the sentencer in a capital case was incompatible with the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.2 In other words, a capital sentencing statute 
must not prevent the sentencer from considering any aspect of the 
defendant’s character and record or circumstances of the offense as an 
independent mitigating factor.3 It was through that lens that the Supreme 
Court struck down Ohio’s capital sentencing statute.4 
Lockett not only made clear what was unacceptable in capital 
sentencing statutes (limiting the range of mitigating factors to be 
considered)5 but also heralded the significance and breadth of mitigating 
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1. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
2. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978).
3. Id. at 605. 
4. Id. at 608-09. 
5. Id. 
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factors that must be affirmatively and independently considered by jurors, 
courts and counsel; the inverse correlation between mitigating factors and 
disproportionate sentencing; and the interrelationship between mitigating 
factors and narrowing—all in an effort to provide a “meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is imposed from 
the many cases in which it is not.”6 
I. THE AFFIRMATIVE MANDATE OF LOCKETT 
To ensure proportionality, states and the federal government must 
“limit the class of murderers to which the death penalty may be applied.”7 
Specifically, “capital punishment must ‘be limited to those defendants 
who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose 
extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.’”8 . 
Given the need for treating each defendant in a capital case with the 
fundamental degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual, 
Lockett held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require capital 
sentencing statutes to permit the “individualized consideration of 
mitigating factors” unique to the defendant.9 In recognition of the 
fundamental respect for humanity, the Lockett Court explained that, 
a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving in-
dependent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and 
record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation cre-
ates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors 
which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between 
life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the com-
mands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.10 
While insisting upon a fine precision in the process—a process 
obviously having huge implications for all capital case participants—the 
Court left to the states the manner in which they would comply with 
Lockett’s mandate.11 Pursuant to that mandate, for example, we now 
understand that affording the fundamental degree of respect to the capital 
defendant (in recognition of his or her uniqueness) requires counsel to 
conduct sufficient investigation and engage in sufficient preparation to be 
6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring). 
7. Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216 (2006). 
8. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)). See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 
(2006) (the death penalty is “reserved for ‘the worst of the worst’”). 
9. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605-06. 
10. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 607-08. 
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able to present and explain the significance of all available mitigating 
evidence.12 Complementary obligations accrue to other case participants, 
including the trial judge13 and appellate courts,14 and prosecutors.15 
II. THE THREAT TO FULFILLMENT OF LOCKETT’S MANDATE BY
“DOUBLE-EDGED” EVIDENCE 
Post-Lockett, recognition of the breadth and essence of mitigation for 
its independent mitigating weight has evolved. That evolution, however, 
has coincided with clamorous efforts by states (and courts) to threaten and 
actually use “double-edged” aspects of mitigation evidence, imperiling 
the fulfillment of Lockett’s individualized mitigating weight mandate 
through the transmogrification of some mitigating evidence (diminishing 
the defendant’s moral culpability) into something not contemplated by 
Lockett. Rather, “double-edged” evidence is used to enhance the 
likelihood that jurors will consider and apply it as aggravation, e.g., 
establishing future dangerousness, and through that process of mental 
evaluation, create the unacceptable likelihood and risk that jurors are 
rendered unable to consider and apply that same evidence for its 
independent mitigating weight. Thus, Lockett’s mandate is undermined, 
increasing the risk that a defendant will receive a death sentence despite 
insufficient culpability. Viewing that risk intolerable as to capital 
defendants within two classes (those with intellectual disability and 16 
and 17-year-olds—each identified by their shared characteristics 
12. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-24 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 393 (2000) (“[I]t is undisputed that Williams had a right—indeed, a constitutionally protected 
right—to provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover 
or failed to offer”). 
13. Trial judges, for example, must give sufficient special instructions to ensure that jurors give 
independent mitigating weight to mitigation evidence. 
14. Appellate courts, in providing heightened meaningful appellate review, must step into the 
shoes of jurors, and, in assessing prejudice, must, “‘consider the totality of the available mitigation 
evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and 
reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.’” Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 955–56 (2010) 
(quoting Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (per curiam)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (courts 
must “reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence”). See 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98 (“[The state court’s] prejudice determination was unreasonable insofar 
as it failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and 
the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—in reweighing it against the evidence in 
aggravation.”). 
15. For example, the general requirement that capital sentencing statutes permit the
individualized consideration of mitigating factors unique to the defendant and Lockett’s more specific 
mandate that the significance and breadth of mitigating factors be affirmatively and independently 
considered have implications for prosecutors’ discovery obligations. 
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reflecting insufficient culpability)—the Supreme Court intervened in 
Atkins v. Virginia16 and Roper v. Simmons17 to categorically exempt those 
classes from the death penalty. 
Despite the Court having put Atkins and Roper defendants beyond 
the grasp of the states for purposes of capital punishment, states continue 
efforts to characterize mitigating evidence as “double-edged” in order to 
justify counsel’s failure to investigate, present and explain that evidence 
to jurors. To this end, state courts have held that “mitigation evidence, by 
nature, often is a ‘two-edged sword’ that, with respect to a jury, may be 
as capable of damaging a case as it is of aiding it.”18 Such evidence has 
been widely recognized by courts as a “two-edged sword.”19 But, is the 
stated threat of “double-edged” evidence real? 
The sleight of hand underlying the threatened use of “double-edged” 
evidence should be clear. First, double-edged evidence does not increase 
a capital defendant’s culpability. In other words, the fact that there could 
be “double-edged” aspects of mitigation evidence doesn’t speak to a 
defendant’s increased culpability. Second, a defendant’s mitigating 
evidence demonstrating lesser culpability should not be the basis of their 
subsequent execution.20 Third, in light of liberally construed relevancy 
standards, to what extent is “double-edged” evidence of a kind the 
prosecution is not already entitled to present through, for example, the 
future dangerousness special issues, as in Oregon and Texas,21 and 
through other states’ aggravating factors and circumstances? Little to 
none. 
In Oregon, for example, courts hold that the admissibility of evidence 
presented to establish future dangerousness is evaluated under the 
16. 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002). 
17. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
18. Montez v. Czerniak, 322 P.3d 487, 506 (Or. 2014) (citations omitted).
19. Similarly, prosecutors argue that “virtually any potentially ‘mitigating’ evidence carries
with it the risk of adversely affecting a defendant.” Brief on the Merits of Respondent on Review at 
48, Montez v. Czerniak, 330 P.3d 595 (2014).   
20. See, e.g., Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds 
by Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (“It should go without saying that 
victims of incest may not be further punished by making their misfortune the basis for their subsequent 
execution.”). 
21. The Texas capital sentencing statutes provide that a jury at the penalty phase of a capital
trial first considers whether there is a probability that the defendant will be a future threat to society. 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071, §(2)(b)(1) (West 2017). In parallel fashion, the Oregon 
capital sentencing statute requires a capital sentencing jury to determine whether, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, “there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society.” OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) (2018).  
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relevancy standard, which is described as a “low bar.”22 The prosecution, 
therefore, is allowed to present a broad range of evidence including, but 
not limited to, evidence of a defendant’s entire criminal history, 
unadjudicated and uncharged bad acts,23 and even evidence of acts for 
which the defendant has been acquitted.24 In other words, because of the 
expansive reach of the future dangerousness special issue, there is very 
little “double-edged” evidence that the prosecution is not already allowed 
to present. 
This suggests that, as seen in the Supreme Court’s early capital 
jurisprudence, the inquiry should not focus upon the double-edged nature 
of the proposed evidence but instead on whether the prosecution already 
presented that or similar cumulative evidence. For example, in Burger v. 
Kemp, the Court held that counsel’s strategic decision to conduct a limited 
investigation and not present additional mitigating evidence that 
contained a substantial amount of aggravating evidence, which was “not 
disclosed” at trial was reasonable under the circumstances.25 Similarly, 
in Darden v. Wainwright, the Court held that petitioner’s newly proposed 
mitigation evidence (that petitioner was a nonviolent man) would have 
opened the door for the State to rebut with evidence of prior convictions, 
which “had not previously been admitted in evidence.”26 Thus, in both 
Burger and Darden, the Court found that the double-edged nature of the 
newly proposed mitigation evidence would have opened the door to 
aggravation evidence that had not previously been admitted into evidence. 
The Court did not, however, find that the double-edged nature of the 
newly proposed mitigation evidence reflected increased culpability by the 
defendant. This suggests that any failure to investigate, present, and 
explain mitigating evidence consistent with Lockett’s mandate must be 
assessed from the perspective of whether or not that mitigating evidence 
could elicit aggravating evidence that is not cumulative to evidence 
previously admitted. 
22. State v. Langley, 363 Or. 482, 511 (2018) (“In terms of evidentiary admissibility, that
standard represents a ‘low bar’[.]”) (citing State v. Davis, 261 P.3d 1197, 1205 (Or. 2011)). 
23. See, e.g., State v. Smith 791 P.2d 836, 852 (Or. 1990). 
24. See, e.g., State v. Williams 912 P.2d 364, 371 (Or. 1996), cert. den., 519 U.S. 854(1996)
(citing to State v. Smith, 532 P.2d 9, 10 (Or. 1975)) (acquittal alone, though it may lessen the probative 
value of evidence of other crime, does not render it inadmissible); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 
342, 343-44 (1990) (neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the federal 
Constitution barred the use of evidence relating to an alleged crime that the defendant previously had 
been acquitted of committing). 
25. 483 U.S. 776, 793 (1987). 
26. 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1986) (emphasis added). 
82 CONLAWNOW [10:77 
III. SPECIAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS A MEANS TO FULFILL LOCKETT’S
MANDATE 
In its post-Lockett reckoning, in addition to identifying the 
significance and breadth of mitigating factors, and given the manner of 
compliance with Lockett’s mandate being left to the states, the Court opted 
to rely upon special jury instructions27 to ensure that jurors would properly 
give independent mitigating weight to mitigating factors unique to the 
defendant (such as a defendant’s intellectual disability).28 The Court 
reaffirmed the importance of special instructions in 2007, noting that 
“[s]pecial instructions are necessary when the jury could not otherwise 
give meaningful effect to a defendant’s mitigating evidence.”29 
Failure to provide sufficient special instructions allowing jurors to 
reliably give meaningful independent mitigating weight to evidence 
diminishing defendant’s moral culpability creates an unacceptable 
likelihood and risk that a death sentence will be imposed in spite of factors 
calling for a less severe penalty.30 Consistent with Lockett’s mandate that 
jurors give independent consideration to a defendant’s mitigating 
evidence, counsel is obliged to request special instructions that both 
encapsulate the mitigating evidence and do so in a manner giving that 
evidence its independent mitigating weight. The extent to which state 
capital sentencing statutes (or trial court action) fails to provide for 
sufficient special instructions to ensure jurors give independent mitigating 
weight to mitigation evidence suggests that the statute is vulnerable to 
either a facial or as-applied constitutional challenge. 
Despite the reliance upon special instructions to ensure the 
fulfillment of Lockett’s mandate, within a matter of 13 years after Penry, 
the Court was faced with the reality that it could not trust that evidence of 
intellectual disability would be given its independent mitigating weight. 
27. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding that the absence of special jury instructions informing jurors 
that it could consider and give effect to Penry’s evidence of mental retardation and abused background 
required a remand for resentencing pursuant to Lockett, “so that we do not ‘risk that the death penalty 
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.’”). 
28. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 337 (“It is clear that mental retardation has long been regarded 
as a factor that may diminish an individual’s culpability for a criminal act.”). 
29. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 253 n.14 (2007). 
30. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 475 (1990) (acknowledging that a “constitutional 
defect lay in the fact that relevant mitigating evidence was placed beyond the effective reach of the 
sentencer[,]” occurring not only when a jury is “precluded from even considering certain types of 
mitigating evidence[,]” as in Lockett, Eddings, Skipper and Hitchcock, but also when, as in Penry, 
“the defendant’s evidence [is] placed before the sentencer but the sentencer [has] no reliable means 
of giving mitigating effect to that evidence”).  
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Instead, the unacceptable likelihood was that, e.g., intellectual disability 
evidence clearly demonstrating lesser culpability was being used as a 
“two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating 
factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury.”31 
IV. CATEGORICAL EXEMPTIONS AS A MEANS TO FULFILL LOCKETT’S
MANDATE 
The Court’s categorical exemption of certain classes of offenders 
from the death penalty is based in part on the unacceptable likelihood and 
risk that state capital penalty sentencing statutes and jurors will not give 
adequate weight to those defendants’ diminished culpability in the face of 
the brutality of their crimes.32 Beyond the categorical exemption extended 
to those with intellectual disability in Atkins, in discussing the need for a 
categorical bar against executing 16 and 17-year-old offenders, the Court 
was also concerned that “[i]n some cases a defendant’s youth may even 
be counted against him.”33 Jurors’ ability to give independent mitigating 
weight to the mitigating arguments based on a defendant’s youth and 
attendant characteristics was impermissibly at risk when that mitigation 
was subject to being overpowered as a matter of course through use of the 
very factors central to mitigating arguments of the attendant 
characteristics of the youth. In short, the Court noted that there was an 
unacceptable likelihood that jurors would be unable to give independent 
mitigating weight to defendants’ youth (and its attendant characteristics), 
resulting in a disproportionate sentence.  
Lockett not only foreshadowed presently-existing categorical 
exemptions but similarly foreshadows possible future categorical 
exemptions. For example, based on the science of brain maturation and 
developmental psychology, the youthfulness and attendant characteristics 
of defendants 18 through 20 years of age are indistinguishable in 
31. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. See also, Penry, 492 U.S. at 324 (noting that a defendant’s 
intellectual disability “may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there 
is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.”) (emphasis added).  
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005) (“The differences between juvenile and
adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the 
death penalty despite insufficient culpability. An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or 
cold-blooded nature of any particular crime could overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as 
a matter of course[.]”). 
33. Id. at 573. Simmons was 17 years old and 5 months at the time of the commission of the
charged murder. The prosecutor used Simmons’s youth as an aggravating factor, blatantly urging 
jurors to ignore the mitigating weight of youth and instead using it to condemn Simmons to death. Id. 
at 558 (“Age, he says. Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that scare you? 
Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.”). 
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neurological development and functioning from the 16 and 17-year-old 
defendants the Roper Court categorically exempted from the death 
penalty due to their insufficient culpability.34 Likewise, the youthfulness 
and attendant characteristics of the still-developing brain of a defendant 
under 21 years of age presents the same unacceptable likelihood (as in the 
case of a 16 and 17-year-old) that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of 
a particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth 
as a matter of course.35 Further, the youthfulness and attendant 
characteristics of a defendant under 21 years of age are often not given 
their independent mitigating weight as required by Lockett, instead being 
used as “double-edged” evidence, thus increasing the likelihood and the 
risk that these defendants will be sentenced to death despite insufficient 
culpability.36 
Similarly, the insufficient culpability of defendants with the 
prenatally established, immutable condition of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum 
Disorder (FASD) is congruent with the classes of defendants categorically 
exempt from the death penalty by way of Atkins and Roper.37 Indeed, the 
mitigating value of the prenatally established, immutable condition of 
FASD presents the same unacceptable likelihood and risk (as present in 
the case of a defendant with intellectual disability or a 16 and 17-year-
old) that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of a particular crime would 
overpower mitigating arguments as a matter of course.38 Further, the 
34. See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as
Unconstitutional, 14-CR-161, 12 (Fayette [Kentucky] Circuit Court Div. 7, 8/1/2017); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, Order Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 15-
CR-584-002 (Fayette [Kentucky] Circuit Court, 9/6/2017); and Commonwealth v. Diaz, Order 
Declaring Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, 15-CR-584-001, (Fayette 
[Kentucky] Circuit Court, 9/6/2017).  After having held pre-trial evidentiary hearings, the Kentucky 
Circuit Court held it unconstitutional to sentence to death individuals “under twenty-one years of age 
at the time of their offense.” The state of Kentucky appealed the Circuit Court’s order.  The cases 
were transferred to the Kentucky Supreme Court where briefing is scheduled to conclude on 
10/12/2018, and amicus curiae appearances by 17 organizations have been authorized.  See, Docket, 
Kentucky v. Bredhold, 2017-SC-000436 (Ky.), available at: https://appellate.kycourts.net/
SC/SCDockets/CaseDetails.aspx?cn=2017SC000436 (last accessed Oct. 10, 2018).   
35. Id. 
36. Id.  A number of cases seeking the categorical exemption of youth from capital punishment 
have been made, are pending, or are in a state of preparation. See, e.g., Bredhold, supra note 34; U.S. 
v. Fell, Case No. 5:01-CR-00012, Donald Fell’s Motion for an order Categorically Exempting Him
from the Death Penalty Because He was Twenty Years Old at the Time of the Alleged Capitals Crimes 
(7/3/2018 D.Vt. ) (issue moot given the case having been resolved through settlement on 9/28/2018); 
and Guzek v. Kelly, Supt. of the Oregon State Penitentiary, Marion County No. 17CV08248 
(challenge to be filed by the author in 2019 in the context of an amended petition for post-conviction 
relief). 
37. See Trevino v. Davis, 861 F.3d 545, 549-50 (5th Cir. 2017).
38. Id. at 550-51. 
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mitigating value of the evidence associated with FASD is often not given 
its independent mitigating weight as required by Lockett, instead being 
used as “double-edged” evidence and thus increasing the likelihood and 
the risk that these classes of defendants will be sentenced to death despite 
insufficient culpability.39 
The same mitigation impediments identified in Atkins and Roper 
exist in relation to the mitigation evidence in these classes of capital 
defendants. Thus, trial participants—jurors, courts, prosecutors, and 
defense counsel accused of breach of duty—cannot be trusted to fulfill 
their obligations to give that evidence its independent mitigating weight. 
Categorical exemptions are indicated where the state and trial participants 
fail to protect and ensure the viability of Lockett’s mandate, those failures 
creating the unacceptable likelihood and risk that a death sentence will be 
imposed in spite of factors calling for a less severe penalty. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF SHIFTING NARROWING FROM LEGISLATIVE 
DETERMINATION TO JUROR SENTENCING FINDINGS 
State legislatures in Lockett’s time generally provided narrow 
statutory definitions of capital murder as a means of satisfying the 
requirement that capital sentencing schemes genuinely narrow the class 
of persons eligible for the death penalty.40 It was in that environment that 
Lockett mandated that jurors give independent mitigating weight to 
39. See, e.g., Appellee’s Brief at 17-18, Trevino v. Davis, 861 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 2017) (No.
15-70019) (“Petitioner assumes that evidence of his alleged FASD would necessarily have mitigated 
his blameworthiness in the jury’s eyes. There is no basis for that assumption. Evidence of diminished 
mental capacity—even when it amounts to intellectual disability—can have both an aggravating and 
a mitigating effect. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989) (“Penry’s mental retardation and 
history of abuse is thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even 
as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Petitioner’s effort to prove that he suffers from 
FASD would only have aggravated the jury’s finding of future dangerousness with no offsetting 
mitigation.”). See also, Defendant’s Trial Memorandum at 78-79, Jesse Johnson v. Premo, Circuit 
Court for the State of Oregon, Marion County No. 08C11553 (Dec. 6, 2013) (“[E]ven if counsel had 
found an expert in 2004 who diagnosed petitioner with FASD, counsel could reasonably have 
concluded that that diagnosis is a ‘two-edged sword’ that might cause the jurors to conclude that 
petitioner is too damaged to be safely controlled in prison. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 
170, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410 (2011) (‘mitigating evidence can be a ‘two-edged sword’ that juries might 
find to show future dangerousness’).”).  
40. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that “[o]ur capital punishment cases 
under the Eighth Amendment address two different aspects of the capital decisionmaking process: the 
eligibility decision and the selection decision.” Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1054 (2018) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) 
(quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971 (1994)). 
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evidence demonstrating lesser culpability or calling for a sentence less 
than death. 
In contrast to relying solely on offense definitions to satisfy the 
narrowing function, as was prevalent during Lockett’s time, states have 
increasingly sought to achieve constitutionally-mandated narrowing 
through penalty phase jurors’ aggravating circumstance findings. Those 
schemes now rely upon penalty phase juror findings for both eligibility 
and selection determinations,41 using the same body of evidence for both 
determinations. This increases states’ abilities to undermine the mitigating 
value of a defendant’s mitigation; encourages and allows jurors to 
transmogrify a defendant’s mitigating evidence into aggravation; and 
provides no means by which jurors can give that potentially life-saving 
evidence independent mitigating weight.42 The result leads to the 
unacceptable risk that jurors will use mitigating evidence as a basis for 
death eligibility and, once having done that, the evidence will have lost its 
mitigating value for purposes of jurors giving it independent mitigating 
weight, effectively limiting the range of mitigating factors to be 
considered—the very thing Lockett condemned. 
VI. CONCLUSION
“Where life itself is what hangs in the balance, a fine precision in the 
process must be insisted upon.”43 Despite the passage of 40 years, Lockett 
continues to guide and inform our understanding of what cannot take 
place in the context of a capital sentencing statute, what has to take place 
in order to treat each capital defendant with the fundamental degree of 
respect due the uniqueness of the individual, and the necessary steps all 
capital case participants must take to counter present and future efforts to 
imperil Lockett’s mandate. 
41. Hidalgo, 138 S. Ct. at 1055 (“Our precedent makes clear that the legislature may satisfy
the ‘narrowing function. . . in either of. . . two ways.’ Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988). 
First, “[t]he legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses. . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
Second, “the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses,” but set forth by statute 
“aggravating circumstances” which will permit the “jury. . . at the penalty phase” to make 
“findings” that will narrow the legislature’s broad definition of the capital offense. Id.; see also 
Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972 (“The aggravating circumstance may be contained in the definition of the 
crime or in a separate sentencing factor (or in both).”) (emphasis added in second instance). 
42. See, e.g., Respondent/Cross-Appellant’s Combined Answering and Cross-Opening Brief
at 35, Sparks v. Premo, 408 P.3d 276 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) (A151267) (“appellate courts have 
recognized, when a defense counsel offers evidence as ‘mitigating,’ the reality is that the jurors may 
not choose to consider it as mitigating. Jurors reasonably may choose to review such evidence as 
aggravating - e.g., as showing that he is seriously damaged and beyond possible redemption. 
Consequently, such evidence is considered a ‘two-edged sword.’”). 
43. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
